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An EU capital markets union (CMU) has been proposed with the aim of revitalising Europe’s economy by creating
eﬃcient funding channels between providers of loanable funds and the ﬁrms best placed to use them. Jon
Danielsson, Eva Micheler, Katja Neugebauer, Andreas Uthemann and Jean-Pierre Zigrand argue that a
successful capital markets union would deliver investment, innovation and growth, but would rely on overcoming
diﬃcult regulatory challenges. They note that if it were successfully implemented, the proposed CMU could also
change the nature of systemic risk in Europe.
European ﬁrms – especially those in periphery countries – have a diﬃcult time attracting funding as they depend on
banks for around 80 per cent of their external ﬁnancing. Yet at the same time, there is no shortage of investable
capital in Europe and savers suﬀer from a lack of investment choices and dismal returns.
The problem is that we have European capital markets – in the plural –but not a uniﬁed European ﬁnancing system.
This malaise is what the capital markets union (CMU) aims to solve: to ﬁnd new and innovative ways to channel
funds eﬃciently from those enjoying surplus resources to those best able to make use of those funds.
Diverse tax regimes and national legislation pose a
fundamental challenge to the existence of a CMU –
and the necessary treaties and directives to solve this
challenge are not on the horizon. For an overview of
the main issues, see Nicolas Véron’s brieﬁng on the
subject and the recent European Commission Green
paper published on 18 February.
In the absence of fundamental reforms of tax and
legal regimes, it is hoped that some progress towards
a CMU can be made by removing some of the myriad
other obstacles that collectively form a barrier to
achieving a truly European ﬁnancing system. To
achieve this, the EU and national authorities will need
to adapt their regulatory systems, especially micro-
prudential regulations, and embrace disruptive
technologies.
As the CMU emerges, it will lower systemic risk by
reducing reliance on banking or other highly concentrated funding channels, thus cutting the regulatory costs of
internalising systemic risk and future bailouts. But it will also create new systemic risks, and the relevant authorities
need to understand those risks and adapt macro-prudential regulations to cope with them.
The problem of smaller businesses
Over 80 per cent of ﬁnancing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Europe comes from banks. Since
SMEs account for 99.8 per cent of businesses and 67 per cent of private sector employment in the EU, scarcity of
bank ﬁnancing is a concern. This compounds other problems facing SMEs, such as the ﬂaws in their structure and
governance discussed by Alberto Giovannini and co-authors here.
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Is the banking system ineﬃcient?
Europe’s SME funding problem arises because banks are under pressure from regulations – not least Basel III – to
build up their capital and to attach increasing risk charges to riskier investments, such as SMEs. Limited competition
– and even oligopolies – in banking add further to European ﬁnancing costs.
Might new sources of intermediation help? There is no inherent reason to believe that banks are fundamentally any
less eﬃcient than the alternative forms of intermediation – and they certainly have strong advantages, not least
through relationship banking. This would seem to give little room for the new alternatives – yet if that were true, there
would be little talk of the CMU.
Because of their systemic importance, banks are increasingly required to be individually safe. Ensuring this safety is
costly, which makes Basel III, with its increases in capital buﬀers, a primary driver of the CMU. Since the new
alternatives are not yet perceived to be systemically important, they do not have to bear this insurance cost. As a
result, banks’ relative ineﬃciency may be the raison d’être for the CMU. But the reason that the new alternatives
have not been able to replace absent bank ﬁnancing is that there are too many barriers in place.
Challenges
There are many factors that might contrive to thwart the success of a CMU. While many are important, those that
really matter are law, tax and regulations, some of which purposefully limit international ﬂows of funding. These
challenges are very sensitive and diﬃcult to tackle, and some have been long discussed.
It seems unlikely that the CMU will attract suﬃcient priority from European authorities for the legislative and tax
challenges to be addressed eﬃciently. Instead, concrete moves towards the CMU are more likely to stem from the
more malleable regulatory process. There are no explicit barriers that prevent the CMU from emerging, but there are
a large number of tiny regulatory restrictions that in aggregate stiﬂe innovation.
A successful CMU must embrace disruption
The root of the problem is in those regulatory mandates that focus more on the status quo – the same status quo
that is threatened by innovative technologies disrupting existing markets and creating new ones.
The regulators need to have an explicit mandate to facilitate the birth of the alternative forms of intermediation that
constitute the CMU. They should be removing complicated and costly micro-prudential regulations more appropriate
to large banks. They should also be developing novel regulations sympathetic to the new vehicles and structures
that make up the CMU, including breaking down national barriers on clearing, settlement and custody services, and
reduce the cost of raising capital. Just one example is the technical obstacles on clearing and registration invoked
by some countries to keep out competition mandated by Europe’s Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).
A sensible approach is that taken by the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) whose mandate – ‘ensuring
markets work well for consumers and for ﬁrms’ – welcomes innovation and disruptive technologies. This may well
have helped the UK to achieve its roughly 200 per cent annual growth in alternative funding models, such as crowd
ﬁnancing, which amounted to over £1.74 billion in 2014 and is predicted to double in 2015.It is not possible to
regulate a successful CMU into existence – but it is possible to redesign regulations to allow it to emerge through
market forces.
Systemic risk
A key function of banks – and also a main source of their systemic risk – is maturity transformation. It is the hedge
against this systemic risk that creates one of the motivations for the CMU. If maturity transformation moves to
alternative forms of investments, the systemic risk does not disappear: rather, it is more likely to re-emerge in the
new institutions. These eﬀects will be partially mitigated by the new technologies being more distributed, diverse
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and reliant on proper securitisation, without involving systemically important ﬁnancial institutions.
But there will still be the danger of herding and correlated risk-taking that only becomes visible in crises, as
discussed here. Such sudden coordination may be harder to detect in the emergent sectors, which is why it is
important for oversight to be well funded and not be so onerous as to encourage opacity.
Furthermore, the successful CMU will create new systemic risks by establishing new links between countries and
entities – links with fault lines that may only manifest themselves in times of signiﬁcant stress. A CMU that ﬁnances
productive investment also makes it easier for speculative investments across Europe, contributing to momentum
build-up and pro-cyclical systemic risk.
From a systemic risk point of view, a well-functioning CMU will be a valuable addition to the existing banking-based
regime, increasing the resilience of the system, provided that capital ﬂows are monitored and the rules are robust,
while discouraging pro-cyclicality. By expanding the range of diﬀerent ﬁnancing routes and decreasing dependence
on banks, a CMU ought to reduce systemic risk for any given level of debt.
Conclusion
Europe needs the CMU because its banking system cannot adequately ﬁnance SMEs. Current regulatory, legal and
tax structures favour the incumbents, and it will be almost impossible to make meaningful changes to the legal and
tax regimes.
Therefore, the EU and especially national authorities must alter existing regulatory structures if the CMU is to be
achieved, encouraging disruptive technologies and allowing market forces to match savings to investment
opportunities more eﬃciently. If successful, the CMU will lead to improved access to ﬁnance for those ﬁrms best
placed to use it – and it will deliver innovation, competitiveness, reduced systemic risk and, ultimately, growth.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article also appears at VoxEU and gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP –
European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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